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ABSTRACTSoil erosion is an important contributor to the agricultural
decline, poverty, and emigration which characterize rural Haiti
today.  The numerous soil conservation projects have often
ignored indigenous knowledge, techniques and socio-cultural
institutions and have not generally resulted in sustained
conservation.  Limited adoption rates have supported widespread
assumptions that peasants were noncooperative, individualistic
actors who required substantial external incentives for changing
land use behavior.  An alternate strategy was utilized in
Maissade, Haiti, where peasants now cooperate to treat small,
multiple-owner watersheds.  Field research was conducted to
understand the cooperative action and the socio-economic factors
associated with participation ("e.g." cooperation) and defection.
Study results indicate that approximately one-half of watershed
landholders participate, and a majority of labor is contributed
by persons who do not own land in the watersheds.  Participants
also regularly treat nonparticipant land, and land tenure status
is independent of both landholder participation and structure
placement.  Indicators of landholder exposure to trans-boundary
erosion and the potential to economically benefit are associated
with participation while the realization of a direct benefit is
not.  Landholder wealth status is independent of participation
though landholders are significantly more wealthy than non-
watershed participants.  Participation is also strongly
associated with membership in farmer cooperatives and labor
exchange groups, and the previous adoption soil conservation
innovations.  The findings challenge conventional wisdom
concerning peasant behavior in Haiti and also suggest that
support of indigenous cooperative institutions can facilitate the
treatment of common environmental problems.
PREFACE
The author is currently conducting research on local
institutions, land use, and policy issues in Haiti.  Field
research for the material presented in this report was conducted
during the months of August, September and December of 1990 in
Maissade, Haiti.  The author is grateful for Save the Children
Federation support during the field survey period and for staff
participation in the development of the research methods and data
collection.  The advice and support of the University of
Minnesota Forestry for Sustainable Development Program and the
Inter-American Foundation is also greatly appreciated.  Special
thanks are especially due the peasants of Maissade whose
eagerness to participate in the study made it a pleasure to
conduct.
A draft of this report was originally prepared in November of
1990 for the SCF field staff who were in the process of
evaluating their micro-watershed program.  That report containedspecific SCF program comments and recommendations.  This updated
report briefly describes the pilot program, research objectives,
methods, and preliminary findings.   The author would appreciate
comments and criticisms from readers.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
  Watershed Management Experience In Haiti
  Recommendations for a Landholder Cooperation Approach to
    Watershed Management
  The Problem: Understanding Factors Associated With
    Participation in Cooperative Watershed Management
COOPERATIVE WATERSHED MANAGEMENT IN MAISSADE: OBJECTIVES,
  ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODS
  Conceptual Framework and History of the Maissade Project
  Synopsis of the Physical and Social Setting
  Objectives of the Watershed Management Program
  Program Assumptions
  Program Methods
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODS
  Objectives
  Methods
    Cooperation in Micro-Watershed Activities
    Technical Survey of Micro-Watersheds
    Open Interviews With Micro-Watershed Committees
    In-Depth Survey of Activity in Two Watersheds
    Socio-Economic Profiles of Landholders and Participants
  Data Analysis
    The Database
    Statistical Analysis
RESEARCH FINDINGS
  Profiles of the Watersheds Studied
    Physical Attributes of the Watersheds
    Land Tenure and Parcel Position: Types and Frequency
    Socio-economic Profiles of Inhabitants
  Description of the Watershed Management Activities
    Ravine Treatment
    Cooperation and Participation
  Factors Associated With Participation
    Landholder Exposure to Trans-boundary Erosion, and Potential
      to Directly Economically Benefit
    Relationship Between Individual Effort and Realization of
      Direct Benefit
    Land Tenure of Parcel Held in Watershed
    Individual's Religious Affiliation
    Individual's Wealth
    Individual's Tendency to Cooperate
    Individual's Tendency to Adopt Innovations    Individual's Age
CONCLUSIONS
  General Conclusions
    Although watershed-based management groups are not always
      formed, complete watershed ravine treatment is possible.
    Participants will voluntarily treat non-participant land
    Groupman and labor exchange groups appear to be the primary
      facilitators of both the adoption and the diffusion of the
      cooperative watershed management innovation
  Factors Associated With Participation in Cooperative Watershed
      Management
  Landholder Exposure to Trans-boundary Erosion, and Potential to
    Economically Benefit
    Relationship Between Individual Effort and Realization of
      Direct Benefit
    Land Tenure of Parcel Held in Watershed
    Individual's Religious Affiliation
    Individual's Wealth
    Individual's Tendency to Cooperate
    Individual's Tendency to Adopt Innovations
    Individual's Age
APPENDIX 1: DESCRIPTION OF WATERSHEDS AND MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY
  Table 1.1, Description of Participation and Effort in
    Watersheds Studied
  Table 1.2, Physical and Socio-economic Characteristics of
    Watersheds Studied
APPENDIX 2: FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH PARTICIPATION
  Table 2.1, Social Profiles of Participants and Non-participants
  Table 2.2, Indicators of Direct Economic Incentive to
    Participate
  Table 2.3, Indicators of Wealth Status of Participants and
    Non-participants
APPENDIX 3: MAPS OF THE WATERSHEDS STUDIED
  Map 1, The Maissade Area Watersheds




Watershed Management Experience In Haiti
Numerous rural development, reforestation, soil conservation and
agriculture development projects have been implemented in Haiti.
By most accounts, the majority have been unsuccessful inachieving significant and lasting impacts (AID 1990, BREDA 1988,
Bureau 1986, Murray 1979).  Watershed management projects
(including reforestation and soil conservation projects) in Haiti
have predominantly utilized the "equipment du territoire"
approach to environmental rehabilitation.  This approach has been
generally characterized by large-scale prescriptions for
contiguous land treatments, large ravine treatments, mechanical
rather than biologic structures, and monetary and commodity
incentives to attract peasant participation (Lilin and Koohafkan
1987).  Highly degraded and steep lands have often been primary
targets for intervention.
The use of this approach for the treatment of privately held
lands - the vast majority of upland watershed lands are privately
owned -- has been criticized by many development professionals
for failing to result in the sustained adoption and maintenance
of the techniques promoted (Lilin 1986, Pierce 1988).  Basic
weaknesses include a primary orientation to the protection of
downstream investments rather than on-site benefits; a disregard
on individual landholder prerogatives, indigenous knowledge or
techniques, socio-cultural institutions or land tenure
complexities (Murray 1979 and Lilin 1986).  In addition,
professionals have claimed that the provision of commodity or
financial incentives can be demeaning, reduce self-reliance,
depress local crop prices, and cause farmers in adjacent areas to
suspend adopting techniques voluntarily.
An "agricultural parcel" approach to watershed management
developed in the early 1980s to complement and serve as an
alternative to the "equipment du territoire" approach
(Smolikowski 1989).  Inherent in the new approach was the
recognition that:
1) farmer remuneration was not necessary for technique adoption
and even acted against technique maintenance and diffusion;
2) a number of low input, indigenous, anti-erosion techniques
existed which could be improved, and;
3) peasants have a natural incentive to conserve soil in order to
increase agricultural production.
This new approach has proven widely successful as numerous
farmers have voluntarily adopted and maintained soil conservation
measures.  The approach embodies a farmer rather than an
engineering perspective of soil erosion, and views watersheds as
primarily a set of agricultural parcels rather than as one
contiguous physical unit.  Projects which use the "agricultural
parcel" approach generally employ classic agricultural
development strategies: training and hiring field extension
agents; integrating basic agricultural themes into resource
conservation dominated extension programs; and conducting basic,
adaptive agricultural research.  Such projects also tend to
include or be associated with programs in community development
or public health and have often carried the title of "integrated"
watershed management projects.Recommendations for a Landholder Cooperation Approach to
Watershed Management
The "agricultural parcel" approach has proven effective in
achieving the treatment of individual and private parcels and is
a widely utilized project approach in Haiti.  Use of this
approach alone though does not resolve the problem of erosion
which crosses private property boundaries, occurs between two
private boundaries, or in public domain courses.  This problem of
"trans-boundary" erosion multiplies with growing land subdivision
as natural boundaries, ridges and gullies, are increasingly used
to delineate boundaries.  Unless such erosion is treated, the
"agricultural parcel" approach does not result in improved
overall levels of agricultural production and environmental
rehabilitation which is the goal of watershed management in
Haiti.
In these circumstances, there is a need for watershed management
approaches which build on the success of the "agricultural
parcel" approach yet explicitly target "trans-boundary" erosion.
In Haiti, where parcels are small and erosivity high, such an
approach should address the close interdependence of land
productivity -- how upstream land use affects downstream
productivity, and how both upstream and downstream landholders
are better off if erosion is reduced.  Such an approach must then
promote either landholder land use agreements and independent
landholder action, or collective agreements and collective action
to install soil conservation treatments.  Whatever the choice,
both modes require landholder cooperation, and call for new
extension themes, different program strategies and perhaps new
social formations.
Many authors and development workers have cited the need to
recognize and empower local, indigenous groups in natural
resource projects.  Several authors, notably Dani and Campbell
(1986) and Bochet (1986) have explicitly and thoroughly treated
the subject of local participation in watershed management
activities.  Few authors have specifically proposed the promotion
of collective landholder action for treating watershed lands
which are common to them.
Cernea (1989) has called for watershed management approaches
which form "watershed groups" (groups of farmers based on land
ownership within watersheds) to establish and maintain watershed
and forestry treatments.  In a similar vein, Murray (1990) has
promoted the establishment of "hillside units" of Haitian farmers
to collaborate on the treatment of contiguous watershed lands.
Uphoff (1986) also recommends the recognition and promotion of
local groups for watershed management.  McKean (1986) states that
the though limited, the literature from Japan shows that
collective management is capable of assuring stable and
productive use of watersheds over a long period of time.  None of
the above authors has explicitly proposed methods to form suchgroups, or discussed requisite incentive structures for farmer
participation.
Gibbs (1986) also concluded that watershed projects should adapt
their methods to reflect customary institutional arrangements,
and create incentives for local groups to participate in
watershed management activities.  Rocheleau and van den Hoek
(1984)  described a project where landholders of a small
watershed were encouraged to cooperate on the installation of
agroforestry treatments for watershed management.  No follow-up
reports which indicate the effectiveness of the project or
sustainability of the activity are publicly available.  Perhaps
the most concise and explicit call for research into landholder
cooperation for watershed management is found in Brooks et al.
(1990):
"What is needed is basic research to identify possible mechanisms
to promote cooperation among watershed residents and users, and
the development of practical systematic methods for identifying
possible mechanisms on a case by case ("i.e.", project) level.
In this context it would be appropriate to look at both
traditional and current patterns of political and social
organization, particularly labor exchange, among the various
groups concerned, patterns of interaction among those groups and
between them and government officials, and the relative success
(or lack of it) of previous attempts to promote cooperation
within watershed areas."
The Problem: Understanding Factors Associated With Participation
in Cooperative Watershed Management
In sum, there is consensus for the need of an expanded role of
local, cooperative institutions in watershed management, but
theories concerning such institutions, how they might be
identified, evolve or be promoted are limited.  Before
formulating theories concerning the emergence of cooperative
institutions for watershed management, and before evaluating the
watershed management programs which use landholder cooperation
approaches, there is a need to understand the factors influencing
landholder participation in cooperative watershed efforts.  A
number of basic questions arise: What economic incentives do
landholders have to participate?  How does this incentive vary
with landholding position in the watershed?  What social or
cultural attributes (including: religious affiliation; age;
wealth; land tenure or cooperative tendencies) are correlated
with participation or defection?  Research into these questions
was conducted at the Save the Children Federation (SCF) Watershed
Management Project in Maissade, Haiti, as they have utilized a
cooperative watershed management approach since 1988.  A
description of that project and program follow.COOPERATIVE WATERSHED MANAGEMENT IN MAISSADE: OBJECTIVES,
ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODS
Conceptual Framework and History of the Maissade Project
In 1986 SCF, with financing from USAID, initiated a pilot,
Integrated Watershed Management project in Maissade, Haiti (a map
is included in Appendix 3).  Project planners combined two new,
yet apparently successful extension approaches:  one, the
formation of "groupman" [note 1] for peasant mobilization and;
two, economic benefit oriented tree planting (embodied in USAID's
Agroforestry Outreach Project).  The "groupman" were to form the
base for Project intervention and be promoted not as ends in
themselves, but as the organizational means by which social,
economic and ecological problems would be addressed (SCF 1985).
Project staff chose to use an agricultural parcel approach to
watershed management.
Synopsis of the Physical and Social Setting
The Maissade Commune is located in the Central Plateau region and
is generally less degraded and more productive than most other
hilly regions of Haiti.  The climate is humid sub-tropical with
an average annual precipitation of m.  Rains are seasonal with a
bi-modal distribution.  Spring rains (April to June) are
typically more intense than the Fall rains (August to October).
Landscapes are dominated by dissected uplands and alluvial plains
derived from calcareous sandstones and conglomerates.  Soils are
predominantly alfisols and vertisols with medium to high levels
of nitrogen, medium to low levels of phosphorous, and high levels
of potassium.  These soils are usually neutral to alkaline and
have an organic matter content of about 1% (Tabor 1988).
The Maissade area has been actively cropped for over 100 years.
Farmers own an average of three non-contiguous agricultural
parcels, and the average parcel size is .7 hectares (Clerisme
1989).  Sugar cane was widely cultivated, and the area's most
important cash crop, until 5 years ago when local stocks were
decimated with an anthracnose fungus.  An Organization for
American States (OAS) study conducted in 1985 found that
approximately 30% of the Maissade area is suited for agriculture
yet approximately 70% was intensely cropped.  Seventy percent of
lands are subject to severe erosion and 45% of all lands slope
between 30 and 60%.  Five percent of all lands are forested
(Erlich 1986).
The vast majority of Commune inhabitants are farmers, and this
includes the majority of the 4000 inhabitants of the town of
Maissade.  A corn-sorghum inter-crop is the predominant cropping
system in the area.  Field beans are cultivated extensively at
higher elevations and yams, plantains, taro, and rice are plantedin the more moisture rich sites.  Hoes are used for cultivation
and few agricultural inputs are used.  Population density in 1986
was approximately 100 per kilometers squared (Erlich 1986).  A
health study conducted in 1989 found an infant mortality rate of
118 per 1000 live births and that acute diarrhea and malnutrition
accounted for 42% of infant deaths (Menager and Tamari 1989).
Objectives of the Watershed Management Program
The SCF Project initiated a pilot micro-watershed management
program in January of 1989 with the following objectives:
1) encourage the uniform treatment of degraded micro-watersheds
(approximately 10 hectares) including the complete treatment of
ravines and hillside agricultural parcels;
2) encourage the creation of new social groups composed of
individuals who either owned or worked lands within degraded
micro-watersheds.  These new, permanent institutions would be
based on the members' common interest in managing rainfall water
to reduce erosion and increase agricultural yields.  These groups
would construct and maintain soil conservation and agroforestry
treatments voluntarily.
SCF aspired to achieve these two objectives in a manner which
would promote the spontaneous replication of the technical
treatments and cooperative behaviors beyond the direct project
impact.  In this manner SCF sought to achieve large watershed
management "from the bottom up", hoping that the treatment of
micro-watersheds would lead to the subsequent treatment of more
and larger watersheds.  After evaluating the results of the
initial "pilot" year, the project intended to expand the program
and continue to support the program for the life of the project
(Gaddis and Smucker 1988).
Program Assumptions
In preparing the micro-watershed program, the SCF staff made the
following basic assumptions:
1) Soil erosion, which decreases agricultural production unless
managed, affects all watershed landholders to varying degrees.
2) In watersheds where farmers rely upon rainfall for
agricultural production, and where soil moisture retention is
a critical factor for production, the management and lack of
management of that rainfall can mean the difference between
degraded and productive lands, low or high crop yields, and
single or diverse crop farming systems.
3) Simple, low-labor and no financial input, indigenous-basedtechnologies exist which can drastically reduce erosion and the
destructive nature of high flows, cause substantial sediment and
moisture retention and thereby increase the productivity and
diversity of crops both in ravines and on slopes in the
short-term.
4) Because of the vulnerability of soil conservation structures
to high flows, downstream land owners can not effectively act
alone.  It is thus in their economic interest to cooperate with
upstream owners in treating upstream lands prior to treating
downstream lands.  This scenario of trans-boundary
interdependence between upstream and downstream farmers is
especially evident in the case of ravines, and is understood by
peasants.
5) Because of the relatively high labor requirements for the
construction and maintenance of effective ravine structures, it
is in landowners' interest to cooperate on the construction of
the structures.  Peasants actually perceive the construction of
ravine structures as requiring group effort.
6) Previous SCF action to form "groupman" would positively affect
the willingness of certain individuals to cooperate on new,
complete watershed treatment schemes.
Program Methods
In brief, the method utilized by SCF in 1989 to promote
cooperation for micro-watershed management was to:
1) identify eight degraded watersheds averaging 10 hectares where
the percentage of landowners who were "groupman" members was
relatively high, and some landowners had already constructed soil
conservation measures.  This initial step was completed in
January 1989;
2) conduct on-site meetings with all landowners and land workers
in each watershed to discuss local agricultural production
trends, the economic effect of the untreated ravine on yields,
the potential economic benefit of treatment, the physical,
economic and social interdependency of owners, and potential
cooperation and coordination for watershed treatment.  The
purpose of this step was to develop consensual knowledge
concerning the common problem and the optimum solution.  This
step was completed in February 1989;
3) provide non-directive support for the formation of watershed-
specific groups whose initial purpose was to construct soil
conservation measures, and provide technical assistance to these
groups on their chosen work days.  This step was conducted from
mid February through June of 1989.
The results of the work conducted in year one were reflected in
the almost complete treatment of the ravines in two of the eightbasins targeted, partial ravine treatment in four, and almost no
activity in two.  Groups worked almost exclusively in the common
ravine and did not work on the private agricultural parcels of
the participants.  Individuals within the basins did install
measures on their agricultural parcels.
In 1990 the project expanded the program to a total of 21 basins
and, in order to accelerate the level of peasant effort, made the
following significant program changes:
1) increased the presence and influence of project field staff in
the planning and execution of cooperative activities;
2) encouraged the establishment of formal micro-watershed
committees (representatives of basin farmers chosen by
participating farmers) who assumed a directive role in the
planning and execution of the work;
3) provided agricultural tools (approximately five per watershed)
as an in-kind incentive.
The results of the second year activities are included in the
following section on Research Findings; Brief Description of
Micro-Watersheds and Activities.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODS
Objectives
The first objective of the research is to investigate and briefly
analyze the collective watershed management activity promoted by
Save the Children Federation (SCF) in the Maissade area.  This
investigation would include an analysis of the ravine treatment
and the collective work activity by watershed.
The second, and principal objective of the research described in
this paper is to gain a greater understanding of what factors
influence participation in the cooperative watershed management
activities in the Maissade area.  In order to fulfill this
objective the following factors will be compared between
participant and non-participant populations to determine
differences and correlation with participation:
1) Individual exposure to trans-boundary erosion, and potential
to directly benefit economically.  This factor is indicated by
landholding position in the watershed (sideslope, upstream,
midstream, downstream) and length of principal ravine on
individual's land holding.
2) Relationship between individual effort and realization ofdirect economic benefit.  This factor is indicated by the
location and number of checkdams constructed, and whether their
location is commensurate with individual participation.
3) Land tenure of agricultural parcel held in the watershed.
4) Individual's religious affiliation.  This factor is indicated
by two variables: official religious affiliation (Catholic or
Protestant) and participation in "voodoo" [note 2] ceremonies.
5) Individual's wealth.  This factor is indicated by total number
and size of lands held, and the number of cows and pigs owned.
6) Individual's tendency to engage in cooperative activities.
This factor is indicated by membership in farmer groups, and the
manner in which the individual acquires labor for major
agricultural tasks.
7) Individual's tendency to adopt innovations.  This factor is
indicated by the prior adoption of soil conservation techniques.
8) Age of the individual.
Methods
Various survey instruments (formal and informal, socially and
technically oriented) were utilized to acquire substantial
information in a short period of time, as well as to permit
cross-referencing.  These instruments were implemented by the SCF
staff of agroforestry technicians, animators (peasant organizers)
and the author during August, September and December, 1990.  A
brief description of each survey follows.
Cooperation in Micro-Watershed Activities
The purpose of this survey was to learn the names of participants
and non-participants; the level of participation and treatment in
each targeted watershed; peasant perceptions of the role and
functions of the group; the relative level of group maturity.
This survey was influenced by Dr. E. Ostrom's work on the
survival and performance of institutions for collective action
(Ostrom 1985) and A. Dani and J. Campbell's proposed methods for
evaluating participation (Dani and Campbell 1986).  The survey
was also prepared in questionnaire form, part of which could be
completed directly by the animators and part of which required
open interviews with peasants.  One survey form was completed for
each targeted watershed.  The results of this survey are
presented in Table 1.1 of Appendix 1.
Technical Survey of Micro-Watersheds
The purpose of this survey was to learn of land tenurearrangements; property ownership and boundaries, and the position
of each soil conservation structure built cooperatively.  Surveys
were completed by SCF technicians in 21 of the 22 of the
watersheds studied. Watershed areas were defined as all lands
upstream of the lowest parcel whose owner was invited to the
watershed management meetings.  Watershed limits and sizes, as
well as approximate property boundaries were interpreted from
aerial photographs.  The photographs used were taken in 1987 by
on Organization of American States supported project.  The scale
of these photos is 1:15000.  Some of the basic information
resulting from this survey is presented in Table 1.2 of Appendix
1, and a map of a sample watershed is included in Appendix 3.
Open Interviews With Micro-Watershed Committees
This survey was conducted by the author after analyzing the
previously mentioned surveys.  The purpose of this survey was to
gain information on subjects not covered in sufficient depth, and
to cross reference information gathered in the animator and
technician administered surveys.  Additional questions were asked
concerning the perceived costs and benefits of cooperation;
participant and non-participant histories and socio-economic
status, level of consensus within the committee on the nature of
the land degradation problem; and the value of alternative
solutions and the feasibility of the chosen solution.
In-Depth Survey of Activity in Two Watersheds
Following the completion of the above surveys, three watersheds,
representing the extremes in levels of participation, were chosen
for in-depth study.  In this survey the author held multiple
interviews with landholders and various local authorities to
gather anecdotal evidence as to the underlying reasons for the
abnormal levels of cooperation or defection.
Socio-Economic Profiles of Landholders and Participants
Socio-economic profiles of all individuals who hold land within
the sample watersheds and all participants in the management
activities were conducted.  Survey parameters included: religious
affiliation, manner in which the individual acquired labor for
major agricultural tasks, total number of land parcels owned,
total area of land holdings, number of landholdings in the
watershed, land tenure of holdings in the watershed, age, sex,
number of cows and pigs owned, whether the individual was a
member of "groupman" or not, number of work events assisted,
number of checkdams which were constructed on the individuals'
land, and whether the individual has adopted contour soil
conservation measures or not.  Information concerning wealth
(land, pigs, and cows) is difficult to obtain in rural Haiti and
was not reported if of questionable reliability.  All information
was cross-referenced between the local "animate," trusted local
informants, and the author.  As most rural Haitians do not know
their exact age, the ages reported are felt to be reliable within5 years.  Results of this survey are presented in Appendix 2.
Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.
Data Analysis
The Database
Most data collected from the above surveys were compiled in
database form.  The database included both the names of all
individuals who either own land in one of the 22 watersheds or
participated in the collective, watershed management activity
(n = 268).  The landowners were divided into two categories;
those who participated (n = 101), and those who did not (n = 85).
Another category of individuals was comprised of participants who
did not own land in one of the 22 watersheds (n = 82).  In
addition to names, 19 other attributes were established to
describe the individual and their relationship to the watershed
management activity.  These attributes were arranged as columns
and included:
1) name of watershed where a landholder or active;
2) gender;
3) age;
4) whether the individual is a "groupman" member or not;
5) whether the individual claims a Catholic or Protestant
religious affiliation;
6) whether the individual is known to regularly conduct "voodoo"
religious ceremonies or not;
7) whether the individual has previously adopted contour soil
conservation techniques or not;
8) total number of owned or inherited land parcels;
9) total hectarage of owned or  inherited land parcels;
10) number of pigs owned (over the age of 6 months);
11) number of cows owned;
12) number of parcels held in the watershed;
13) type of tenure arrangement to parcels in watershed, whether:
- owned ("te tit, achte, eritye");
- undivided inheritance ("indivize");
- rented ("te fem, pretansyon"); or
- crop-shared ("demwatye");14) means by which the individual conducts major agricultural
tasks ("i.e." labor acquisition), whether the individual works:
- individually ("pou kont yo");
- in pairs ("boukante maten");
- cooperatively, in reciprocal exchange groups ("asosye");
- hires day labor ("bay djob");
- individually and hires day labor;
15) number of collective watershed management work events in
which the individual participated;
16) number of ravine checkdams which were constructed on the
individual's property;
17) position of the individual's parcel in the watershed,
whether:
- sideslope ("i.e." the individual's parcel does not include a
portion of the principal ravine);
- upstream ("i.e." head of principal ravine);
- midstream ("i.e." between upstream and downstream parcels);
- downstream ("i.e." the most downstream parcel and the parcels
in which the principal ravine was jointly held by two adjoining
landholders);
18) length of principal ravine on parcel;
19) whether the ravine is held jointly or held by one individual.
Responses were recorded for each individual in all columns except
for: 2 nulls in the tenure arrangement column;  7 nulls in the
labor acquisition column; 69 nulls in the total parcels column;
102 nulls in the total hectarage column; 24 nulls in the cows
column; and 27 nulls in the pigs column.
Statistical Analysis
As presented in Appendix 2., Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, all
individuals were divided into three categories; watershed
landholders who participated, watershed landholders who did not,
and participants who did not own land in the watershed where
active.  Sample means were generated for the attributes recorded
as parametric data, and sample proportions were generated for the
attributes recorded as categoric data.  Statistics from these
three populations were compared to determine whether they were
the same and from the same population.  This information was used
to determine which of the attributes surveyed was correlated with
participation.  The X squared statistic was used to test the
categorical data, and the two-tailed Z score used to compare
means of the parametric data.  Data and results are presented in
Appendix 2. Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.
RESEARCH FINDINGSProfiles of the Watersheds Studied
As the watersheds studied are randomly located in the southern
foothill region the Maissade Commune, they can be considered as
random samples of this region of rural Maissade.  Information
collected concerning watershed inhabitants and land tenure type
(represented in the "Combined" category, Appendix 2. Tables 2.1
and 2.3) can thus be considered to approximate the mean
conditions for this region of Maissade.
Physical Attributes of the Watersheds
The 22 micro-watersheds studied average 9.0, and range from 2.1
to 34.2 hectares in size.  Average hillslope is 12%, and the
average length of the principal ravine is 424 meters (see
Appendix 1. Table 1.1).  The streams are not perennial and only
carry storm flow.
Land Tenure and Parcel Position: Types and Frequency
There are an average of 8.9 separate agricultural parcels and 8.5
land holders per watershed.  The average reported parcel size is
.7 hectares.  Of the parcels held in the watersheds: 52% are
owned ("achte, eritye, tit"); 33% can be classed as undivided
inheritance ("indivize"); 9% are rented ("fem, pretansyon"); and
5% are under crop-share arrangements ("demwatye").  Fourteen
percent of landholders work lands in which the principal ravine
is jointly owned.  In this situation, the centerline of the
principal ravine forms the property boundary between adjoining
parcels.  Of watershed parcels: 27% can be described as having an
sideslope position ("i.e." do not contain a major ravine); 16%
are upstream (i.e. are located at the head of the ravine system);
37% are midstream ("i.e." located between up- and downstream
positions); and 20% are downstream ("i.e." either the most
downstream position, or which the ravine is jointly owned).  The
results described in this Section are presented in Appendix 2.
Table 2.1, and Table 2.2 in the "Combined" column.
Socio-economic Profiles of Inhabitants
Of watershed landholders (n = 186): 57% are "groupman" members;
56% have adopted soil conservation techniques; 74% express a
Catholic religious affiliation (and the complementary % expressed
a Protestant affiliation); and 70% regularly conduct "voodoo"
ceremonies.  The average age of landholders was 42 years old.
Of landholders: 41% claim to conduct major agricultural tasks
individually ("pou kont yo"); 13% work in pairs ("boukante
maten"); 16% work in cooperative, reciprocal exchange groups
("asosye"); 10% hire day labor ("bay djob"); and 20% equally hire
outside labor and work individually (see Appendix 2. Table 2.1).Landholders own (either in "tit, achte," or "indivize" tenure) an
average of 3 separate land parcels, and a total of 2.5 hectares.
This finding corroborates that of Clerisme (1989).  Landholders
also own and average of 1 cow and 1 pig (see Appendix 2. Table
2.3).
Description of the Watershed Management Activities
Ravine Treatment
An average of 27 checkdams were constructed per watershed (with a
range of 2 to 92) during the two season's activity.  A total of
590 checkdams were constructed in the 22 watersheds.  Principal
ravines were completely treated [note 3] in 10 watersheds,
partial treatment was achieved and 7 and only scant treatment was
achieved in 5 watersheds.  Checkdams were constructed on the
lands of 49% of all landholders.  An average of 3 checkdams were
constructed per parcel (See Appendix 1. Table 1.2, Appendix 2.
Table 2.2, and Appendix 3.).
Cooperation and Participation
Of all landholders, 54% participated, and an average of 4.6
landholders participated per watershed.  An average of 3.7
individuals who did not own land in the watersheds participated
per watershed.  These individuals are referred to as non-
watershed participants in the data tables.  The number of
landholder person/work events averaged 32.2 per watershed, and
the number of non-watershed person/work events averaged 18.5.
Thus, an average of 57% of all person/work events were
contributed by individuals without lands in the watershed.
Landholding participants who benefitted from checkdam
construction on their land averaged a total of 8 work events at
the time of the survey; landholding participants who did not
benefit from checkdam construction on their land averaged 6 work
events; and non-watershed participants averaged 5 work events
(See Appendix 1. Table 1.2).  The findings concerning non-
watershed participation unsuspected and contradict SCF's goal of
achieving watershed management amongst watershed landholders.
The number of work events per watershed per season averaged 9 in
1989 and 6 in 1990.  In only 3 of the 22 watersheds did
participants claim to have worked cooperatively together prior to
micro-watershed management program initiation.  Participants in
13 of the 22 watersheds claimed to have worked cooperatively
prior program initiation, but not in the same group.
Participants in all of the watersheds claimed to plan to work
together to treat other watersheds when the finished with the
ravine treatment in the initially targeted watershed.  Such a
diffusion of behavior has occurred in 4 of the 22 watersheds as
these groups have worked a total of 14 work events in watersheds
adjoining that initially targeted (See Appendix 1. Table 1.2).Factors Associated With Participation
The principal objective of the research described in this thesis
is to gain a greater understanding of what factors influence
participation in cooperative watershed management activities.  In
essence, the purpose of the research is to determine which types
of individuals participate, which do not, and why.  As the role
of "non-watershed" participation became apparent it also became
imperative to understand who they were and what incentive they
had to participate in the watershed treatment.  The compiled data
and summaries of the statistical analyses of the factors
influencing participation are presented in Appendix 2. Tables
2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.
Landholder Exposure to Trans-boundary Erosion, and Potential to
Directly Economically Benefit
An "a priori" assumption in this Section is that potential to
directly economically benefit is a prime motivation for
participation in the collective treatment effort.  Similarly, it
is assumed that peasants calculate that they reduce their chances
to benefit if they do not participate (i.e. the collective
watershed treatment group will skip their land, if they do not
participate to a degree corresponding to the level of effort
needed to treat their land).  Another assumption is that
landholders directly benefit when checkdams are constructed on
their land.  This assumption is based on the observation that due
to sediment accumulation and subsequent moisture retention, the
checkdam creates an enhanced micro-site for crop cultivation.
Observation and ongoing research indicate that with checkdam
installation, farmers generally shift to the cultivation of more
valuable crops, and that productivity on the new micro-site can
double previous levels.  This hypothesis is reinforced by the
widespread adoption of checkdams by farmers in the Maissade area.
The potential for landholders to directly benefit in these
manners is indicated by landholding position in the watershed
(sideslope, upstream, midstream, downstream) and length of
principal ravine on individual's land holding.  Following this
logic, one would assume that individuals whose lands were in the
sideslope position would participate less than those with
landholdings in the up-, mid-, and downstream positions.
Similarly, one would assume that individuals who own lands in the
mid- and downstream position would participate to a greater
degree because they have both the most to gain from watershed
treatment activity, and the most to lose from inactivity.  Also,
one would assume that individuals with greater lengths of ravine
would participate to a greater degree than those who owned no
ravine because they have can benefit the greatest from the
cooperative activity.
The following null hypotheses concerning the direct economic
incentive to participate were tested and appear in Appendix 2.Table 2.2:
1) The null hypotheses that true proportions of parcel position
types for parcels held in the watersheds are the same in the
non-participant and participant categories was rejected
(X squared = 17.0; p < 0.001; df = 3).
2) The null hypotheses that the mean length of ravine owned by
individuals in the participant and non-participant categories are
the same was rejected (p = 0.029).
Watershed landholding position and ravine length thus did
influence participation.  Participants tended to own greater
lengths of ravine than non-participants (68 meters versus 55
meters).  The majority of participants held either upstream or
midstream positions (67%), while the majority of non-participants
held sideslope or downstream positions (63%).  This influence
though is not absolute; 34% of participants held sideslope or
downstream positions, while 36% of non-participants held up- or
midstream positions.  When compared with the "Combined" category
(which represents all watershed landholders), participants
disproportionately held up- and midstream positions, while
non-participants disproportionately held sideslope and downstream
positions.  These findings counter the hypothesis that
individuals with downstream holdings would disproportionately
benefit because of their enhanced exposure to risk and potential
to benefit.
Relationship Between Individual Effort and Realization of Direct
Benefit
Conventional wisdom among watershed management planners in Haiti
is that individuals would not voluntarily work on ("i.e." treat)
non-participant lands.  This assumption is based on the
perception that peasants do not perceive that their individual
and/or social gain would exceed their individual and/or social
cost.  This widespread assumption is also influenced by notion
that Haitians are very individualistic and have limited social
loyalty.  This notion belies the finding that "voodoo" encourages
transactional social coherence, and that kin and labor exchange
obligations can lead to socially beneficial behavior.  As
effective watershed management demands that interventions be
situated according to physical rather than socio-political
factors, an extension of the conventional wisdom would be that
all landholders must participate in order to achieve watershed
management.  It is thus important to test whether the placement
of interventions is dependent upon participation or not.
The following null hypotheses concerning the relationship of
between participation and direct benefit were tested and appear
in Appendix 2. Table 2.2:
1) The null hypotheses that true proportions of landholders who
hold parcels on which checkdams were constructed are the same in
the non-participant and participant categories was rejected(X squared  = 26.8; p < 0.001; df = 1).
2) The null hypotheses that the mean number of checkdams
constructed on lands held by individuals in the participant and
non-participant categories are the same was rejected (p = 0.001).
Though a majority of participating landholders benefitted with
checkdams constructed on their lands (66% of all landholding
participants), checkdams were also constructed on 28% of
non-participating landholder lands.  Participants thus did
disproportionately benefit in relation to non-participants,
but only in the gross and not net terms.  The 28% of
non-participating landholders who benefitted did so at no cost.
Examined economically, the individual net gain of these "free
riders" was much higher than that of the participants.
Of a total of 590 checkdams constructed in the watersheds 460
(78%) were constructed on participant land and 130 (22%) were
constructed on non-participant land.  Non-participants averaged
2 checkdams apiece while participants averaged 4.  Thus, though
participants did disproportionately benefit, land treatment was
not precluded by non-participation.  Field observations indicated
that on numerous occasions participants would go upstream to
treat non-participant lands in order to assure the stability of
downstream treatments, and participants would occasionally treat
the lands of an absent companion.
As stated in the previous Section, one could assume that an
individual would participate to a degree which would correspond
to their potential to directly benefit.  The following null
hypotheses concerning the relationship between level of effort
and direct benefit were tested and appear in Appendix 2. Table
2.2:
1) The null hypotheses that the mean number of collective work
events worked by landholders who directly benefitted (with
checkdams constructed on their land) and those who did not are
the same was accepted (p = 0.157).
2) The null hypotheses that the mean number of collective work
events worked by landholders who directly benefitted (with
checkdams constructed on their land) and non-watershed
participants are the same was rejected (p = 0.008).
3) The null hypotheses that the mean number of collective work
events worked by landholders who did not directly benefit (with
checkdams constructed on their land) and non-watershed
participants are the same was accepted (p = .386).
These tests indicate that participation is not strongly
correlated with direct economic benefit.  The mean number of work
events worked by landholders who benefitted, landholders who did
not, and non-watershed participants was 8, 6, and 5 respectively.
Because of high levels of variation, there was no significantdifference in the amount worked by those who benefitted and those
who did not.  Again, contrary to conventional wisdom,
participation is not based on direct economic gain.  It is
hypothesized that either the non-benefitting participants
benefitted in ways other than that measured.  For example,
perhaps they owned downstream parcels and were keenly interested
in reducing the torrential ravine flow in order to protect their
property.  Other socio-cultural factors such as kin or labor
exchange obligations, may also influence their decision to
participate.  These will be discussed in following Sections.
The incentive for non-watershed participants to participate,
regardless of their inability to directly benefit has not yet
been discussed.  One of the above tests showed that their level
of participation was not significantly different than that of the
landholders who benefitted.  Incentives for this surprising level
of effort might be of a socio-cultural nature and will be
examined in following Sections.  This finding of substantial
non-watershed participation does indicate that SCF's goal of
forming new watershed management groups based on watershed
landholding was not achieved as envisioned.  In reality, the
watershed management groups are a collection of local individuals
with various ties to the watershed, either physical, or social.
Land Tenure of Parcel Held in Watershed
Haiti's mixed and largely uncodified land tenure system is
claimed by many watershed management professionals in Haiti to
be a major constraint to the adoption of soil conservation
techniques and overall watershed rehabilitation.  Undivided
inheritance ("indivize"), rented ("fem") and share-cropped
("demwatye") lands (representing about 47% of all parcels in the
watersheds studied) are frequently defined as "insecure" tenures;
and thus are not seen as potential sites for soil conservation
investment.  These conventional opinions are held despite the
lack of valid research on the matter.
In the watersheds studied, the center of the ravine defined the
property boundary (and thus was jointly owned) in 14% of all
parcels.  In these cases neither one landowner or the other has
either an explicit right or duty to treat the ravine.  This
complication infers that ravines in this category would be less
likely to be treated than ravines that are completely owned by
one individual.  Consequently, one could hypothesize that
landholders of "insecure" parcels and jointly held ravines would
participate less than those who hold "secure" tenures and sole
rights to the ravine.
The following null hypotheses concerning the relationship between
land tenure and participation were tested and appear in Appendix
2. Table 2.2:
1) The null hypotheses that true proportions of tenure status
types for parcels held in the watersheds are the same in the
non-participant and participant categories was accepted
(X squared = 5.09; p = 0.165; df = 3).2) The null hypotheses that true proportions of individuals with
jointly held ravines are the same in the non-participant and
participant categories was rejected (X squared = 4.72; p = 0.030;
df = 1).
The first test indicates that there was no significant difference
in land tenure status of agricultural parcels held by
participants and non-participants, and thus participation is not
dependent upon the land tenure arrangement of lands held in the
watersheds.  Surprisingly, participant lands are
disproportionately "insecure" (54% of their lands) when compared
to both the non-participant and combined categories (39% and
47% respectively).
Further examination found that 58% of all checkdams were
constructed on owned land ("te tit" or "te achte"), 28% were
constructed on undivided inheritance land ("te indivize"),
7% were constructed on rented land ("te fem"), and 9% were
constructed on crop-shared land ("demwatye").  As watersheds were
categorically treated from the top-down and the skipping of
parcels was rare, and as these percentages reflect closely land
tenure patterns in the watersheds (52% owned, 33% inherited,
8% rented and 5% crop-shared), land tenure appears to have had
little impact on the placement of ravine treatments in the
watersheds.  This finding also infers that the "insecure"
classification is not useful in determining which landholders
might invest in soil conservation.  Land "security", and
willingness to invest in soil conservation is thus apparently
more a product of social linkages than tenure type.
The second test indicates that there is a significant difference
in the proportion of landholders who jointly hold ravines between
participants and non-participants.  Only 9% of participants have
joint ravine tenure while 14% of all watershed landholders, and
20% of non-participants have such an arrangement.  This finding
infers that joint ravine tenure can hinder participation in
collective watershed management efforts.
Individual's Religious Affiliation
The possible correlation between religious affiliation and
participation was also examined.  Though popular opinions on the
matter abound, to the author's knowledge, no similar studies have
been conducted in Haiti.  The following null hypotheses
concerning the relationship between religious affiliation and
participation were tested and appear in Appendix 2. Table 2.1:
1) The null hypotheses that true proportions of individuals who
express a Catholic religious affiliation are the same in the
non-participant, participant, and non-watershed categories was
rejected (X squared = 10.2; p = 0.006; df = 2).
2) The null hypotheses that true proportions of individuals who
regularly conduct "voodoo" ceremonies are the same in thenon-participant, participant, and non-watershed categories was
rejected (X squared = 11.1; p = 0.004; df = 2).
The first test indicates that participants are disproportionately
Protestant to a statistically significant degree.  Though 74% of
all landholders are Catholic, 65% of participants, 83% of non-
participants, and 63% of non-watershed participants expressed a
Catholic affiliation.  These results might be explained by the
hypothesis that in Haiti, where the vast majority of individuals
are born Catholic, individuals who are Protestant not only have
the gall or drive to reject the "status quo" (or be the offspring
of parents who defied the norm), but are also active in pursuing
a different tack.  This suggests that people of such character
might also tend to participate in watershed management activities
which are also a rejection to the norm of erosion and declining
yields.  This rejection of the "status quo", and active
participation is reinforced by the Protestant churches, as
anecdotal evidence suggests that Protestant institutions in
Maissade tend to promote evangelicalism to a greater extent than
the Catholic church.  Protestant "missions", where groups of the
devout march to other areas to preach or raise churches, are
frequently seen in the Maissade area.
Though 70% of all landholders regularly conduct "voodoo"
ceremonies, 80% of non-participants, 61% of participants, and
57% of non-watershed participants do the same.  The second test
indicates that these differences are statistically significant.
Regardless of official religious affiliation, a majority of rural
Maissadians practice "voodoo."  Protestant churches (and many
Protestants) publicly claim to reject "voodoo" to a greater
extent than the Catholic church.  The Catholic church in Haiti is
often painted by Protestants as the refuge for "voodoo".  Thus,
it is hypothesized that fewer Protestants actively practice
"voodoo" than do Catholics, and thus fewer participants and non-
watershed individuals regularly conduct "voodoo" ceremonies.
Individual's Wealth
It can be hypothesized that with increasing wealth, the relative
importance of potential benefits is decreased ("i.e." the
marginal value of the benefit decreases), and thus the potential
for participation would decline.  Similarly, in Haiti, with
increasing wealth the tendency for the landowner to actively work
their own parcel declines.  Generally speaking, the more wealthy
the individual, the greater tendency they have to rent out or
crop-share their lands.  This arrangements would remove the
landholder from the agricultural areas and thus decrease their
potential for participation.  In this study individual wealth is
indicated by total number and size of lands held, and the number
of cows and pigs owned.
The following null hypotheses concerning the relationship between
wealth and participation were tested and appear in Appendix 2.
Table 2.3:1) The null hypotheses that the mean number of land parcels held
by landholders in the participant and non-participant categories
are the same was accepted (means are equal).
2) The null hypotheses that the mean number of land parcels held
by individuals in the participant and non-watershed categories
are the same was rejected (p < 0.001).
3) The null hypotheses that the mean number of land parcels held
by individuals in the non-participant and non-watershed
categories are the same was rejected (p < 0.001).
4) The null hypotheses that the mean number of hectares held by
individuals in the non-participant and participant categories are
the same was accepted (p = 0.523).
5) The null hypotheses that the mean number of hectares held by
individuals in the participant and non-watershed categories are
the same was accepted (p = 0.070).
6) The null hypotheses that the mean number of hectares held by
individuals in the non-participant and non-watershed categories
are the same was rejected (p = 0.026).
7) The null hypotheses that the mean number of cows owned by
individuals in the non-participant and participant categories are
the same was rejected (p < 0.001).
8) The null hypotheses that the mean number of cows owned by
individuals in the non-participant and non-watershed categories
are the same was rejected (p < 0.001).
9) The null hypotheses that the mean number of cows owned by
individuals in the participant and non-watershed categories are
the same was rejected (means are equal).
10) The null hypotheses that the mean number of pigs owned by
individuals in the participant, non-participant and non-watershed
categories are the same was accepted (all means are equal).
The first three tests indicate that though there is no
statistical difference between the mean number of parcels held by
participants (3) and non-participants (3); there is a statistical
difference between the number owned by landholders and the number
owned by non-watershed individuals (2).  Similarly, though there
is no significant difference in total hectarage owned by
participants and non-participants (2.2 and 2.8 respectively); a
significant difference does exist between hectarages owned by
non-participants and non-watershed individuals (1.6).  Because of
high variation in the participant population, the difference
between hectarages owned by participants and non-watershed
individuals was not found to be significant at the p = .05 level.
Tests 7., 8. and 9. indicate that non-participants own a
significantly greater number of cows than both participants and
non-watershed individuals (2, 1, and 1 respectively).  Test 10.indicates that all categories own the same mean number of pigs.
In sum, these tests indicate that though the non-participant
landholder population may be sometimes be wealthier than
landholders who participate (indicated only by the larger number
of cows owned), there is a more remarkable difference in wealth
status between the non-watershed population and the combined
landholder population.  Except for the number of pigs owned,
non-watershed individuals were categorically less wealthy than
the watershed landholders.  These results indicate that though
wealth status is not strongly correlated with landholder
participation, it is inversely correlated with non-watershed
participation.
Thus, contrary to what might be expected, wealth does not
apparently negatively influence landholder participation.  Rather
than refuting the general hypothesis that people of wealth would
participate less, this finding is probably more an indicator of
the scarcity of "wealthy" peasants.  Hypotheses concerning why
the non-watershed participants tend to be less wealthy will be
presented in the following Section.
Individual's Tendency to Cooperate
Some individuals tend to exhibit cooperative tendencies and some
do not, and most do sometimes.  The various hypotheses as to why
or where cooperative tendencies exist would be influenced by
socio-cultural patterns, economic incentives and is probably
highly dependent upon context, but to delve further into this
question is not within the scope of this thesis.  It could be
hypothesized that those that exhibited cooperative tendencies
prior to the initiation of the micro-watershed program would
participate to a greater degree than those that did not.
The following null hypotheses concerning the relationship between
individual tendency to cooperate and participation were tested
and appear in Appendix 2. Table 2.1:
1) The null hypotheses that true proportions of individuals who
are "groupman" members are the same in the non-participant,
participant, and non-watershed categories was rejected (X squared
= 75; p < 0.001; df = 2).
2) The null hypotheses that true proportions of individuals who
acquire labor in similar manners are the same in the
non-participant, participant, and non-watershed categories was
rejected (X squared = 59.4; p < 0.001; df = 8).
Of all watershed landholders, 57% are "groupman" members while
79% of landholder participants, 29% of non-participants and 90%
of non-watershed individuals are members.  This statistically
significant difference, and high correlation of "groupman"
membership with participation, is not too surprising as high
degree of membership was one criteria for the watershed selection
in the micro-watershed management program, and as "groupman"members commonly engage in community development activities.
That 90% of the non-watershed participants are members is
striking, especially in light of the finding that non-watershed
participants contributed 57% of the watershed management effort.
This finding is important as in micro-watershed program
implementation SCF made no attempt to rally local "groupman"
members to participate or serve as project agents.  SCF met with
the landholders of targeted watersheds, and it was they
themselves (or the "groupman" members themselves) who initiated
this non-watershed participation.  This phenomenon is probably
due to project inculcation that individual gains can be met
through collective means, and that all individuals benefit when
groups as a whole benefit.
Upon analysis of the other attributes studied, "groupman"
membership is the most common denonimator for non-watershed
participants.  This finding indicates not only that social
organization can be strongly correlated with the adoption of
collective watershed management activities, but that "groupman"
members do act as volunteer agents to promote the activity.
The second test also found a statistically significant difference
between how participating and non-participating landholders, and
non-watershed participants acquire labor for major agricultural
tasks.  Approximately 90% of non-participating landholders either
work their land individually or hire day labor (or do both),
while only 53% of participating landholders and 36% of non-
watershed individuals acquire labor in those manners.  About 46%
of participants exchange labor cooperatively (either in pairs or
in groups) while only 10% of non-participants acquire labor in
these manners.  An even greater percentage of non-watershed
participants exchange labor (63%).
These findings confirm the conventional hypothesis that
individuals who do not exhibit cooperative tendencies would not
tend to participate in cooperative watershed management
activities.  In addition to the cooperative tendency explanation,
the high percentage of non-watershed participants who engage in
exchange labor groups indicates that this reciprocal mechanism
might be a prime incentive for non-watershed individuals to
participate.  As social linkages cross physical watershed
boundaries, members of labor exchange groups can and probably
live and farm in multiple watersheds.  If one of the group has
agreed to cooperate with neighbors to treat a watershed it is not
implausible that the regular  exchange partner might participate
as well.  In this manner the non-watershed participant might
build up labor debts for reciprocation.  These trans-watershed
linkages could also be a mechanism for the diffusion of the
complete watershed treatment innovation.
Individual's Tendency to Adopt Innovations
It can be hypothesized that an individual's previous adoption of
soil conservation practices would correlate with a potential for
participation in cooperative watershed management activities.
The following null hypothesis concerning the relationship betweenindividual adoption of soil conservation techniques and
participation were tested and appear in Appendix 2. Table 2.1:
1) The null hypotheses that true proportions of individuals who
have adopted soil conservation techniques are the same in the
non-participant, participant, and non-watershed categories was
rejected (X squared = 76.5; p < 0.001; df = 2).
The proportions of individuals who have adopted techniques in
each category correspond almost directly to those of "groupman"
membership: 56% of all landholders have adopted, while 28% of
non-participants, 79% of participants, and 87% of non-watershed
individuals.  Participation is thus strongly correlated with
technique adoption.  This might be due to adopters previous
recognition of soil conservation benefits, or perhaps because all
adopters are "groupman" members.  Whatever the case, this finding
is strong evidence that the promotion of individual adoption of
soil conservation greatly facilitates the subsequent promotion of
collective watershed management activities.
Individual's Age
Individual age was also tested for correlation with
participation.  One could hypothesize that older people would
participate less (either because of infirmity, risk aversion, or
wealth) than younger people.  The following null hypotheses
concerning the relationship between age and participation were
tested and appear in Appendix 2. Table 2.1:
1) The null hypotheses that the mean ages of individuals in the
non-participant and participant categories are the same was
accepted (p = 0.110).
2) The null hypotheses that the mean ages of individuals in the
non-participant and non-watershed categories are the same was
rejected (p < 0.001).
3) The null hypotheses that the mean ages of individuals in the
participant and non-watershed categories are the same was
rejected (p = 0.025).
The mean age of participating landholders, non-participating
holders and non-watershed participants was 42, 44, and 35
respectively.  The above tests indicate that non-watershed
participants were significantly younger than watershed
landholders, and that landholder participation was not correlated
with age.  Other research conducted by the author and the
literature on labor exchange indicate that it is young, land-poor
males who tend to predominate in labor exchange groups (Murray
1979).  The finding that non-watershed participants are
significantly younger than landholders corroborates the finding
that 63% of this category participate in labor exchange, and that
they are generally less wealthy than watershed landholders.CONCLUSIONS
General Conclusions
Although watershed-based management groups are not always formed,
complete watershed ravine treatment is possible.
It is obvious that the second objective of the SCF micro-
watershed program -- that of creating watershed management groups
based on landholding in a particular watershed -- is not being
realized as envisioned.  Although 54% of landholders participate,
a significant portion of participants (45%) do not own land
within the watershed, and these non-watershed participants
contributed 57% of all labor to the management activities.  In
addition, all of the groups intend to treat other neighboring
basins following the treatment of the targeted basin.  One of the
most advanced groups ("Met Pye") actually spent the majority of
the second season working outside of the targeted watershed
rather than within it.  This "mixed" nature of the groups does
not preclude complete ravine treatment as the principal ravine
has been completely treated in 10 of the 22 watersheds.
In sum, the SCF strategy can result in complete ravine treatment
but the work will probably not be executed by a social unit which
is specific and limited to an individual watershed.  The
existence of this trans-watershed cooperation indicates that
there is likely to be more than one solution to the problem of
peasant coordination for contiguous land treatment.  Different
social conditions would plausibly give rise to different social
reactions and formations.  And thus different project strategies
would be appropriate for different social conditions.
Participants will voluntarily treat non-participant land.
Participants in the cooperative activity have on numerous
occasions worked voluntarily on non-participant land (even
without permission and no hope for reciprocal assistance).
Twenty eight percent of all check-dams were constructed on
non-participant land, and check-dams were built on only 64% of
all landholders' land.  The motivations for this behavior were
not thoroughly researched.  Anecdotally it is known that on
occasions non-participant land was treated when the participants
felt that treatment of that land was necessary to assure the
success of downstream work.  On other occasions participants
treated the land of non-participant kin or companions for
apparent socio-cultural reasons unknown to the author.
"Groupman" and labor exchange groups appear to be the primary
facilitators of both the adoption and the diffusion of the
cooperative watershed management innovation.The vast majority of landholder and non-watershed participants
are "groupman" members and also members of labor exchange groups.
The incentives and obligations corresponding to participation in
these institutions apparently set a foundation for cooperation on
treating trans-boundary problems.  The "regional" rather than
watershed specific dispersion of kin, labor partners and
agricultural parcels can lead to the diffusion of the cooperative
watershed management innovation.  These findings indicate that
the strength of indigenous social institutions ("e.g." "asosye"
and "boukante maten") override the physical linkages determined
by contiguous ownership in small watersheds.  These findings also
offer strong evidence that development agency investment in
peasant organization can greatly facilitate the achievement of
watershed rehabilitation, and the treatment of collective
environmental problems.
Factors Associated With Participation in Cooperative Watershed
Management
Landholder Exposure to Trans-boundary Erosion, and Potential to
Economically Benefit
Watershed parcel position, and length of ravine owned (two
indicators of landholder exposure to trans-boundary erosion and
the potential to economically benefit) did influence
participation.  The majority of participants held either upstream
or midstream positions, while the majority of non-participants
held either sideslope or downstream positions.  This finding
refutes the hypothesis that the holder of the most downstream
position had the greatest incentive to participate and was thus
the most likely to participate.  Up- and midstream positions are
normally more optimum sites for checkdam construction, and thus
the potential for the holder to economically benefit exists.
Sideslope positions are by definition, inappropriate sites for
construction.  Though theoretically, the holder of downstream
parcels might be the most likely to participate, in the
watersheds studied, this incentive was apparently complicated by
the fact that in many downstream parcels the ravine was jointly
held by adjacent landholders.  This disincentive will be
discussed in the following conclusion on the impact of land
tenure on participation.
These findings infer that projects which consider a landholder
cooperation approach to watershed management should concentrate
effort on the up- and mid-stream holders; those with the clearest
potential economic incentive to participate.
Relationship Between Individual Effort and Realization of Direct
Benefit
The realization of a direct benefit (as indicated by checkdamconstruction) was not correlated with participation.  Though more
checkdams were constructed on participating landholder lands than
non-participating landholder lands, participation was not
strongly correlated with the individual's benefit of checkdams.
As stated in General Conclusions number 2., participants
regularly treated non-participant lands.  The level of individual
effort (i.e. number of work events worked) was not significantly
different between those who directly benefitted from checkdams
and those who did not during this period of study.  In addition,
non-watershed landholders contributed 57% of all effort with no
direct benefit as measured by this study.  Thus individual effort
"(i.e." cost) is not commensurate with individual gain during the
period of the study, again, at least as individual gain is
measured by this study.
When considered in light of the previous conclusion, these
findings indicate that the actual realization of checkdams (or
of another unmeasured benefit) during the same year as labor is
expended is not a precondition for participation.  The first
conclusion indicated that landholders who participate tend to
have the clearest potential for economic gain.  Landholders who
participate and who did not benefit a checkdam during the period
studied, might participate now to assure a delayed benefit, when
the watershed groups treats their land next year.  The motivation
for non-watershed landholders to participate might be similar
(i.e. anticipation of future checkdam construction on their
land).  The incentive for the non-beneficiaries to participate
could also very likely be other, unmeasured benefits such as
labor reciprocity, or kin obligations.
Land Tenure of Parcel Held in Watershed
Land tenure status of parcels held in the watershed did not
influence landholder participation.  No significant difference
exists in the frequency of land tenure types between participants
and non-participants.  Contrary to conventional belief, the
holding of short-term and undivided land tenure arrangements
("fem, pretansyon, demwatye, indivize")did not negatively affect
the participation of the holders and the placement of soil
conservation measures.  The holders of these un-codified tenures
are regular participants and same-season economic gains derived
from the treatments seem to be the incentive for short-term
holders to participate and adopt soil conservation treatments.
This finding infers that strong or strengthened social linkages
can overcome the commonly perceived problem of "insecure" short-
term and undivided land tenure arrangements.  Further, social
ties and not the term of tenure apparently determines land
"insecurity".
Though tenure over parcels held in the watersheds was not
correlated with participation and the placement of treatments,
the tenure of the ravine was important.  Individual's who jointly
hold rights to principal ravines (a common characteristic of
parcels in the downstream position where the ravine forms a
common property boundary) tended to participate less than those
who have clear rights to the entire ravine.  This findingsuggests that promoters of cooperative watershed management
should encourage cooperation amongst landholders upstream of
where the ravine is jointly held ("i.e." forms a property
boundary).
Individual's Religious Affiliation
An individual's religious affiliation does influence
participation.  Participants are disproportionately Protestant
and are less likely to regularly conduct voodoo ceremonies than
non-participants.  This finding might be a reflection of what
types of people choose to be Protestant, or a reflection of the
institutional messages passed by Protestant churches.  As this
topic is politically volatile and beyond the expertise of the
author, no specific interpretations or recommendations will be
made.  This finding does at least indicate that watershed
planners should not preclude channeling watershed management
messages through religious institutions.
Individual's Wealth
Landholder's wealth (as indicated by the number and size of
landholdings, cows and pigs) apparently does not influence
participation.  A difference in landholder wealth is not
significant between participating and non-participating
landholders.  In comparison, landholders are significantly more
wealthy than non-watershed participants.  This finding infers
also that there is no significant wealth differences between
individuals in the watersheds studied.  The finding that the
non-watershed participants are less wealthy corresponds to the
finding that they tend to be younger and work in labor exchange
groups (see following Sections).  Their incentive to participate
can only be postulated; perhaps they are returning kin
obligations, perhaps they are building up labor debts so as to
assure access to adequate labor demanded.
Individual's Tendency to Cooperate
An individual' tendency to cooperate, as indicated by "groupman"
membership and cooperative labor acquisition tendencies, is
strongly correlated with participation.  This conclusion is drawn
from the finding that 29% of non-participating landowners are
"groupman" members, 79% of participants are members and 90% of
non-watershed participants are members.  "Groupman" membership is
also the most common attribute of non-watershed participants.
This finding indicates that the individual satisfaction derived
from the promotion of social benefit, or the fulfillment of a
social duty might be the strongest incentive for non-watershed
individuals to participate.
The manner in which individuals acquire labor for major
agricultural tasks also influences participation.  A majority of
participants engage in cooperative labor exchange arrangements
("boukante maten, asosye") while a majority of non-participantseither work their land as individuals or hire day labor ("pou
kont yo, bay djob").  These findings infer that projects which
seek to promote cooperative watershed management should consider
investing in the formation of peasant organizations, and/or
channel extension efforts through existing labor exchange groups.
Individual's Tendency to Adopt Innovations
An individual's tendency to adopt soil conservation innovations
is strongly correlated with participation.  While only 28% of
non-participants have adopted soil conservation techniques,
79% of participants and 87% of non-watershed participants have
adopted soil conservation techniques.  This finding indicates
that either adopters participate because they recognize the
economic benefits of soil conservation, or because they just
happen to be the type of people who adopt innovations.  Whatever
the case, this finding is strong evidence that the promotion of
soil conservation techniques to individuals facilitates the
subsequent adoption of cooperative watershed management.
Individual's Age
An individual's age does not influence landholder participation,
but younger ages are correlated with non-watershed participation.
The non-watershed participant's disproportionate youth
corroborates findings that they tend to be less wealthy and
exchange rather than hire labor.  This finding infers that except
if seeking to encourage non-watershed participation, watershed
programs should not consider age as an important factor in
cooperative watershed management.
APPENDIX 1: DESCRIPTION OF WATERSHEDS AND MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY
Table 1.1,  Description of Participation and Effort in Watersheds
Studied
Parameters                         Watersheds
                                     1    2    3    4    5    6
Initial year of activity.           89   89   89   89   89   89
No. landholder participants.         4    5    4    7    2    8
No. non-wsd participants.            1    5    3    8    3    1
No. landholder person/work events.  45   37    9   21   16  242
No. non-wsd person/work events.     14    8    8   18   10   33
No. work events in wsd ravine.    0/14  5/5  4/0  2/2  4/7 28/5
No. work events outside wsd.       0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0
Do wsd groups plan to work in other wsds (1=yes; 0=no)?
                                     1    1    1    1    1    1
Did participants work collectively in the same group  prior to program?                  0    0    0    0    0    0
Did participants work collectively in various groups
  prior to program?                  0    1    1    1    0    1
No. checkdams in wsd.                9   26    9   35   19   85
Parameters                            Watersheds
                                    7    8    9   10   11   12
Initial year of activity.          89   90   90   90   90   90
No. landholder participants.        6    3    6    2    3    2
No. non-wsd participants.          10    2    6    4    3    5
No. landholder person/work events. 62    8   35   24   26    3
No. non-wsd person/work events.   135    6   14   33   31   11
No. work events in wsd ravine.   11/4    3   13   10   11    3
No. work events outside wsd.      0/7    0    0    4    2    0
Do wsd groups plan to work in other wsds (1=yes; 0=no)?
                                    1    1    1    1    1    1
Did participants work collectively in the same group
  prior to program?                 1    0    0    0    1    0
Did participants work collectively in various groups
  prior to program?                 0    0    1    1    1    0
No. checkdams in wsd.              92    2   34   13   12   16
Parameters                         Watersheds
                                  13   14   15   16   17   18
Initial year of activity.         90   90   90   90   90   90
No. landholder participants.       4    8    4    4    1    7
No. non-wsd participants.          6    3   12    2    5    0
No. landholder person/work events. 8   38   11   12    5   38
No. non-wsd person/work events.    9   17   26    5   16    0
No. work events in wsd ravine.     3   10    4    3    5    8
No. work events outside wsd.       0    0    0    0    0    0
Do wsd groups plan to work in other wsds (1=yes; 0=no)?
                                   1    1    1    1    1    1
Did participants work collectively in the same group
  prior to program?                0    0    0    0    1    0
Did participants work collectively in various groups
  prior to program?                1    1    1    1    0    1
No. checkdams in wsd.             36   54   20   12    9   16
Parameters                         Watersheds
                                   19   20   21   22  Mean   S.D
Initial year of activity.          90   90   90   90     /    /
No. landholder participants.        9    3    4    5   4.6   2.2
No. non-wsd participants.           0    3    0    0   3.7   3.2
No. landholder person/work events. 25   12   12   19     /    /
No. non-wsd person/work events.     0   13    0    0     /    /
No. work events in wsd ravine.      8    4    0    6   9/6  10/4
No. work events outside wsd.        0    1    0    0    .6   1.7
Do wsd groups plan to work in other wsds (1=yes; 0=no)?
                                    1    1    1    1   1     0
Did participants work collectively in the same group
  prior to program?                 0    0    0    0    .1   .4
Did participants work collectively in various groups
   program?                         1    0    0    0    .6   .5No. checkdams in wsd.              35   20   16   20  26.8 23.3
Notes:
1). Figures presented in this table are the results of a survey
conducted in August and September, 1990.
2). Watershed code.  1) Do Pye Moris (1);  2) Do Bwa Pen;  3)
Savan a Palm;  4) Zeb Razwa;  5) Paloat;  6) Nan Manwel;  7) Met
Pye;  8) Dlo Kontre;  9) Larik;  10) Do Pye Moris (2);  11) La
Guam;  12) Vikam;  13) Zeb Gine;  14) Savan a Palm (Talma);  15)
Tidjo;  16) Perikit;  17) Fond Pikan;  18) Nan Silinn (LSY);  19)
Basya; 20) Ba Simitye;  21) Nan Silinn (MJ);  22) Nan Nikola.
3. The first and second numbers in the work events columns
indicate events in 1989 and 1990 respectively.
Table 1.2, Physical and Socio-economic Characteristics of
Watersheds Studied
Parameters                         Watersheds
                                   1    2    3    4    5    6
Wsd area (has).                    4.8  3.6 11.3  3.7  9.1 20.1
No. land parcels.                  6    5   12   14    8   14
No. land holders.                  6    5   11   13    8   14
Mean parcel size (has).            1.0  0.6  0.4  0.5  0.3  1.0
No. parcels with long-term tenure arrangements.
                                   6    4   10    9    7   13
No. parcels with short-term tenure arrangements.
                                   0    1    2    5    1    1
Mean slope of parcels (%).        10    5   15    6   30   34
Length of principal ravine (m).  237  413  455  497  432 1061
Parameters                         Watersheds
                                   7    8    9   10   11   12
Wsd area (has).                    8.4  4.0 22.8  8.1  /  5.3
No. land parcels                  15    5    8    5    4    4
No. land holders.                 14    5    7    5    4    4
Mean parcel size (has).           .5   .8   .6    /    /   .4
No. parcels with long-term tenure arrangements.
                                  12    4    8    5    4    3
No. parcels with short-term tenure arrangements.
                                   3    1    0    0    0    1
Mean slope of parcels (%).         8    6    7    /    /    6
Length of principal ravine (m).  417  254  465    /    /  282
Parameters                         Watersheds
                                  13   14   15   16   17   18
Wsd area (has).                    5.7 34.2  6.0  2.1  4.0  3.6
No. land parcels                  10   20    6    5    5    7
No. land holders.                  9   20    4    5    5    7
Mean parcel size (has).           .3   1.6  .5    /    /   1.0
No. parcels with long-term tenure arrangements.                                  10   19    2    3    5    7
No. parcels with short-term tenure arrangements.
                                   0    1    4    2    0    0
Mean slope of parcels (%).         4    4    7    /    /   17
Length of principal ravine (m).  337    /  198  190    /  659
Parameters                         Watersheds
                                  19   20   21   22   Mean   S.D
Wsd area (has).                   19.1  3.1  5.3  3.7  9.0   8.3
No. land parcels                  17    4   14    7    8.9   4.8
No. land holders.                 16    4   13    7    8.5   4.6
Mean parcel size (has).          1.0    /   .9    /    0.72  0.35
No. parcels with long-term tenure arrangements.
                                  14    3   13    6    7.6   4.4
No. parcels with short-term tenure arrangements.
                                   3    1    2    1    1.3   1.4
Mean slope of parcels (%).        34    /    6    /   12.4  10.7
Length of principal ravine (m).  717  274  313    /  424   222
Notes:
1) Figures presented in this table are the results of a survey
conducted in August and September, 1990.
2) Watershed code.  1) Do Pye Moris (1);  2) Do Bwa Pen;  3)
Savan a Palm; 4) Zeb Razwa;  5) Paloat;  6) Nan Manwel;  7) Met
Pye; 8) Dlo Kontre;  9) Larik;  10) Do Pye Moris (2);  11) La
Guam; 12) Vikam;  13) Zeb Gine;  14) Savan a Palm (Talma);  15)
Tidjo;  16) Perikit;  17) Fond Pikan;  18) Nan Silinn (LSY);  19)
Basya;  20) Ba Simitye;  21) Nan Silinn (MJ); 22) Nan Nikola.
3) Mean parcel size was converted from fractions of "carreaux" (1
"carreau" = 1.29 hectares) as reported by landholders.  As
landholders do not know the precise size of their holdings, these
means are approximations.
4) Long-term tenure arrangements include purchased ("te achte, te
tit"), divided ("te erite"), and undivided inheritance lands ("te
indivize").
5) Short-term tenure arrangements include rented ("te fem,
pretansyon", and crop-shared ("demwatye").
APPENDIX 2:  FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH PARTICIPATION
Table 2.1,  Social Profiles of Participants and Non-participants
Variable            Watershed Landholder               Non-wsd
                    Category                        Participants
                    Non-Participants  Combined
                    Part.
No. of individuals in each category.
                     85     101           186           82% who are "groupman" members.
                     29      79            57           90
% who have adopted soil conservation techniques.
                     28      79            56           87
% who are female.     6       5             5           10
% who are Catholic (complementary % expressed a Protestant
affiliation).        83      65            74           63
% who regularly conduct "voodoo" ceremonies.
                     80      61            70           57
Manner in which individuals conduct major agricultural tasks
(labor acquisition):
% who work individually ("pou kont yo"):
                     48      34            41           21
% who work in pairs ("boukante maten"):
                      6      20            13           16
% who work cooperatively ("asosye"):
                      5      26            16           47
% who hire day labor ("bay djob"):
                     14       6            10            2
% who work individually and hire day labor:
                     27      13            20           13
Mean age (standard deviation in parentheses).
                  44(14)  41(11)        42(13)       35(11)
Notes:
1) Figures presented in this table are the results of a survey of
all watershed landholders and all management activity
participants in the 22 watersheds.  Data was collected in
December, 1990.
2) Statistical analysis: The X squared statistic was used to
compare variable proportions between categories and types for the
categorical data (expressed in this table as %).
Test 1 The null hypotheses that true proportions of individuals
who are "groupman" members are the same in the non-participant,
participant and non-watershed categories was rejected (X squared
= 75.; p = 0.000; df = 2).
Test 2 The null hypotheses that true proportions of individuals
who have adopted soil conservation techniques are the same in all
categories was rejected (X squared = 76.5; p = 0.000; df = 2).
Test 3 The null hypotheses that true proportions of individuals
who express a Catholic religious affiliation are the same in all
categories was rejected (X squared = 10.2; p = 0.006; df = 2).
Test 4 The null hypotheses that true proportions of individuals
who regularly conduct "voodoo" ceremonies are the same in all
categories was rejected (X squared = 11.1; p = 0.004; df = 2).
Test 5 The null hypotheses that true proportions of individuals
who acquire labor in similar manners are the same in all
categories was rejected (X squared = 59.4; p = 0.000; df = 8).
3)  Statistical analysis: A two-tailed Z-test was used to testhypotheses that mean ages are the same between categories of
individuals.
Test 1 The null hypotheses that the mean age of individuals in
the non-participant and participant categories are the same was
accepted (p = 0.110).
Test 2 The null hypotheses that the mean age of individuals in
the non-participant and non-watershed categories are the same was
rejected (p = 0.000).
Test 3 The null hypotheses that the mean age of individuals in
the participant and non-watershed categories are the same was
rejected (p = 0.025).
Table 2.2,  Indicators of Direct Economic Incentive to
Participate
Variable                           Watershed Landholder Category
                           Non-participant  Participant  Combined
No. of individuals in each category.   85          101       186
% of holders who benefited checkdams.  28           66        49
Mean no. of checkdams constructed per parcel.
                                      2(3)         4(5)      3(4)
Tenure status of parcels held in watershed:
% owned ("tit" or "achte"):            58           47        52
% undivided inheritance ("indivize"):  28           38        33
% rented ("fem" or "pretansyon"):       9            8         9
% crop-shared ("demwatye"):             2            8         5
Position of parcel in watershed:
% sideslope (i.e. no ravine on parcel): 36          20        27
% upstream (i.e. top of ravine):        13          19        16
% midstream (i.e. mid-ravine):          23          48        37
% downstream (i.e. bottom of ravine):   27          14        20
Mean length of ravine owned:         55(37)      68(44)    62(45)
% of individuals with joint ownership of ravine:
                                        20           9        14
Mean no. of work events in which individuals participated: those
who benefited checkdams:                  /         8(8)        /
  those who did not:                      /         6(6)        /
Variable                                     Non-wsd Participants
No. of individuals in each category.                           82
% of holders who benefited checkdams.                           0
Mean no. of checkdams constructed per parcel.                   0
Tenure status of parcels held in watershed:
% owned ("tit" or "achte"):                                     /
% undivided inheritance ("indivize"):                           /
% rented ("fem" or "pretansyon"):                               /
% crop-shared ("demwatye"):                                     /
Position of parcel in watershed:
% sideslope (i.e. no ravine on parcel):                         /% upstream (i.e. top of ravine):                                /
% midstream (i.e. mid-ravine):                                  /
% downstream (i.e. bottom of ravine):                           /
Mean length of ravine owned:                                    /
% of individuals with joint ownership of ravine:                /
Mean no. of work events in which individuals participated: those
who benefited checkdams:                                        /
  those who did not:                                         5(5)
Notes:
1) Figures presented in this table are the results of a survey of
all watershed landholders and all management activity
participants in the 22 watersheds.  Data was collected in
December, 1990.
2) Statistical analysis:  The X squared statistic was used to
compare proportions between categories and types indicated with
categorical data (expressed here as %).
Test 1 The null hypotheses that true proportions of landholders
who benefited checkdams are the same for non-participant and
participant landholders was rejected (X squared = 26.8;
p = 0.000; df = 1).
Test 2 The null hypotheses that true proportions of tenure status
types are the same for non-participant and participant
landholders was accepted (X squared = 5.09; p = 0.165; df = 3).
Test 3 The null hypotheses that true proportions of parcel
position types are the same for both categories for non-
participant and participant landholders was rejected
(X squared = 17.0; p = 0.001; df = 3).
Test 4 The null hypotheses that true proportions of individuals
with jointly held ravine parcels are the same for both non-
participant and participant landholders was rejected
(X squared = 4.72; p = 0.030; df = 1).
3) Statistical analysis: A two-tailed Z-test was used to test the
hypotheses that variable means are the same for the all
categories of individuals.
Test 1 The null hypotheses that the mean number of checkdams
constructed on participant and non-participant lands are the same
was rejected (p = 0.001).
Test 2 The null hypotheses that the mean length of ravine owned
by participants and non-participants is the same was rejected
(p = 0.029).
Test 3 The null hypotheses that the mean number of work events
worked by participants who directly benefitted and those who did
not was accepted (p = 0.157).
Test 4 The null hypotheses that the mean number of work events
worked by participants who did not directly benefit and non-wsdparticipants was accepted (p = 0.386).
Test 5 The null hypotheses that the mean number of work events
worked by participants who directly benefited and non-wsd
participants was rejected (p = 0.008).
Table 2.3, Indicators of Wealth Status of Participants and
Non-participants
Variable                           Watershed Landholder Category
                           Non-participant  Participant  Combined
No. of individuals in each category.    85          101       186
Mean no. of parcels held ("tit" or "indivize").
                                       3(1)         3(2)     3(2)
Mean no. of hectares held ("tit" or "indivize").
                                   2.2(2.1)     2.8(6.5) 2.5(5.0)
Mean no. of cows owned.                2(2)         1(2)     1(2)
Mean no. of pigs owned.                1(1)         1(1)     1(1)
Variable                                  Non-wsd Participants
No. of individuals in each category.                        82
Mean no. of parcels held ("tit" or "indivize").            2(1)
Mean no. of hectares held ("tit" or "indivize").       1.6(1.3)
Mean no. of cows owned.                                    1.1
Mean no. of pigs owned.                                    1(1)
Notes:
1) Figures presented in this table are the results of a survey of
all watershed landholders and all management activity
participants in the 22 watersheds studied.  Data was collected in
December, 1990.
2) Statistical analysis: A two-tailed Z-test was used to test the
hypotheses that variable means are the same for the all
categories of individuals.
Test 1 The null hypotheses that the mean number of parcels held
by individuals in the participant and non-wsd categories are the
same was rejected (p = 0.000).
Test 2 The null hypotheses that the mean number of parcels held
by individuals in the non-participant and non-wsd categories are
the same was rejected (p = 0.000).
Test 3 The null hypotheses that the mean number of hectares held
by individuals in the participant and non-participant categories
are the same was accepted (p = 0.523).
Test 4 The null hypotheses that the mean number of hectares held
by individuals in the participant and non-wsd categories are the
same was accepted (p = 0.070).Test 5 The H O that the mean number of hectares held by
individuals in the non-participant and non-wsd categories are the
same was rejected (p = 0.026).
Test 6 The null hypotheses that the mean number of cows owned by
individuals in the participant and non-participant categories are
the same was rejected (p = 0.000).
Test 7 The null hypotheses that the mean number of cows owned by
individuals in the non-participant and non-wsd categories are the
same was rejected (p = 0.000).
APPENDIX 3: MAPS OF THE WATERSHEDS STUDIED
Map 1, The Maissade Area Watersheds
Map 2, Example Watershed: One of the 22 Studied
NOTES
1. "Groupman" are pre-cooperative peasant groupings established
upon traditional social linkages.  The groups commonly engage in
collective social and economic activities and average eight
members.
2. It is assumed that the vast majority of Haitians believe in
some aspects of the "voodoo" folk religion.  The people of
Maissade distinguish between those who regularly "sevi loua" by
donating "plat manje" to ancestral spirits, and those who have
ceased to continue this practice.  It was this distinction that
was used to categorize the individuals surveyed.
3. The "completely treated" watershed category includes those in
which the principal ravine is treated from the uppermost parcel
to the most downstream parcel.  The "partial" category includes
those in which more than one checkdam has been constructed on
more than one parcel.  The "scant" category includes those
watersheds in which less than 10 treatments have been installed
on one or fewer parcels.
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